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CASE COMMENTS
like early cargo owners, should not be required to prove the negli-
gent source of their injury. Since an injured crewman is not required,
under Mahnich, to prove negligence on the part of the mate who
selected deficient rope, it would be illogical and contrary to the Su-
preme Court's gear-personnel equivalence to require him to prove the
mate's negligence in selecting a deficient crew. Negligence is no more
a part of the doctrine of unseaworthiness for the crewman than it
was for the cargo owner.30 Failure of the shipowner, therefore, to
allocate sufficient personnel to a particular task, regardless of his
exercise of due care, should render his ship unseaworthy.
MARK R. FERDINAND
CIVIL CONTEMPT IN FEDERAL COURTS
The federal contempt statute, which prescribes those acts for which
a federal court may hold a party in contempt, states that there must
be "disobedience or resistance to ... [the court's] lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command"' to hold a party in contempt.
Whether this statute makes a holding of civil contempt for the un-
authorized removal of the subject matter of the litigation 2 contingent
upon the existence of a previously issued specific court mandate for-
bidding the party's conduct has led to conflict and confusion among
the federal courts.
In Griffin v. County School Bd.,3 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that the members of the Prince Ed-
ward County School Board, in Virginia, were guilty of civil contempt
for disbursing tuition grants to parents of white children enrolled in
private schools, while an appeal from the district court's denial of an
injunction against the disbursement was pending.4 The Court of Ap-
30 See, Ondato v. Standard Oil Co., 210 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1954).
118 U.S.C. § 401 (1964) (Emphasis added.) § 401 also has two misbehavior pro-
visions which are not herein discussed.
2Generally speaking, interference with property in the custody of the law is
contempt of court. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 219 (1932); In re Lowenthal,
74 Cal. 109, 15 Pac. 359, 360 (1887); Clear Creek Power & Dev. Co. v. Cutler, 79
Colo. 355, 245 Pac. 939, 940 (1926); Walling v. Miller, 108 N.Y. 173, 15 N.E. 65,
66 (1888).
3363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir. 1966).
4Griffin is the last of a long line of decisions concerning the reopening of the
Prince Edward County public schools. The events leading up to Griffin are
summarized in Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 224 (1964), where the
Supreme Court approved the District Court's order to reopen the schools and
upheld its injunction forbidding the School Board and the State from disbursing
tuition grants while the public schools remained closed. The School Board com-
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peals held that it possessed the power to hold the members of the
board in contempt even though the lower court had refused to issue
a specific order forbidding the disbursement of the tuition grants. The
majority in Griffin said:
That these acts of the Board of Supervisors constituted a con-
tempt of this court is beyond cavil. The Board undertook to put
the money then available for tuition grants-and then wholly
subject to its orders-beyond its control as well as that of the
court.... Obviously, the aim was to thwart the impact of any
adverse decree which might ultimately be forthcoming on the
appeal. In effect it was a "resistance to its (this court's) lawful
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command." 5
The majority held that the appeal was itself a process within the
meaning of the federal contempt statute and that such process was
resisted by the disbursements. 6
The dissenting judges argued that the federal contempt statute was
intended to limit the contempt powers of the federal courts,7 that the
plied with the order, reopened the schools for the 1964 term but, in addition, ap-
propriated a large sum for the 1964-65 tuition grants. The plaintiffs, on June 29,
1964, moved the District Court to enjoin permanently the payment of tuition
grants. The District Court issued a permanent injunction against retroactive pay-
ments but declined to enjoin future grants. The plaintiffs appealed, but while the
appeal was pending the School Board on August 5, 1964, disbursed one-half of the
appropriated tuition grants. On August 13, 1964, the plaintiffs moved the Court
of Appeals to cite the School Board for contempt. The Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the District Court for further inquiries into the circumstances sur-
rounding the disbursements. Judge Lewis found the Board was not in contempt
because it disbursed only future grants as opposed to retroactive grants. How-
ever, after receiving the findings of Judge Lewis, note 5 infra, the Court of
Appeals held the members of the Board in civil contempt. Griffin v. County
School Bd., 363 F.2d 206, 208-210 (4th Cir. 1966).
5363 F.2d at 210. A detailed account of the acts which took place during the
pending of appeal was made by Judge Lewis of the District Court at the direction
of the Court of Appeals. Judge Lewis found that the Board of Supervisors held
a meeting on August 4, 1964, at which time a petition was filed by Negro citizens
requesting an allocation of additional funds to be used for public education, and
further:
Shortly after adjournment of the Board meeting, Supervisor Jenkins and
Supervisor Steck met a Mr. Taylor and other interested citizens for the pur-
pose of finding a way to pay the '64-'65 tuition grants prior to the time the
Court of Appeals could enter an order staying these payments. ...
The Commonwealth Attorney and two other members of the Board of
Supervisors were then called. Those assembled agreed that if the Board of
Supervisors would increase the tuition grants to $310.00 ...and authorize
the immediate payment thereof, this could be done before the Court of Appeals




majority's interpretation of process was so broad as to render the
statute meaningless,8 and that traditionally the term process had been
used to encompass such things as a summons, a subpoena, a mandate,
or other written order of the court.9
The Griffin dissent is representative of the reasoning of those federal
courts which strictly construe the statute. They typically require
that there be a violation of some specific mandate. 10 The rationale bc-
81bid.
91d. at 213. For example, in Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889), which in-
volved a subpoena, the Court said: "[W]hereas, in case of misbehavior of which
the judge cannot have such personal knowledge, and is informed thereof only by
the confession of the party . . . the proper practice is, by rule or other process
to require the offender to appear and show cause why he should not be punished."
In Burtch v. Zeuch, 200 Iowa 49, 202 N.W. 542, 543 (1925), which involved a
search warrant, the court said: "The act of Burtch was an attempt to make
futile a process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore con-
stituted a criminal constructive contempt, being directed against the dignity and
authority of the court."
10The following cases require a violation of a specific order before the party
may be held in contempt for the removal of the subject matter of the litigation:
NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 261 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1958), held that the statute
limits the contempt power of the courts in that there must have been a specific
order in existence prior to the commission of the alleged contemptuous act. The
court said that any acts prior to the issuance of a specific order can not constitute
contempt "regardless of the intentions of the respondent to avoid the impact of
an order or judgment expected by him to be thereafter entered." Id. at 509.
Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users Ass'n v. McNeil, 131 F.2d 67 (10th Cir.
1942), held that, although the property (tax sale certificates) was in the custody of
the court, the contempt charge could not lie because no injunction had been
issued forbidding the defendant's acts.
Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 380 (1st Cir. 1942), involved an action
by the United States to enforce a milk marketing order. Prior to the issuance of
a decree, the defendant committed acts which allegedly contributed to the insol-
vency of the business. The court held that regardless of how much these acts con-
tributed to the insolvency the defendant could not be held in violation of the
interlocutory or final decree.
In In re Sixth & Wisconsin Tower v. Aitkin, 108 F.2d 538, 539 (7th Cir. 1939),
the defendant, during a reorganization proceeding, sent to creditors letters al-
legedly containing false information designed to cause the creditors to refuse to
adopt the reorganization plan. Plaintiff contended that the subject matter of the
letters was included in the petition submitted to the court and "that the subject
matter being before the court for consideration, had the same effect as an order
enjoining appellant from doing that which is complained of." The court held
that the proceeding did not constitute an order and, therefore, there was no
violation.
Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939), involved a restrain-
ing order to prevent a county from levying tax deeds on the plaintiff's land sold
by the county during the pendency of the appeal. The defendant was not held
in contempt of court since no order was issued forbidding such activity.
In re Probst, 205 Fed. 512 (2d Cir. 1913), involved a bankrupt, who during the
stay of execution, sold some of his property and appropriated money to his own
use. He was not held in contempt as no order was issued forbidding the act.
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hind the strict interpretation is that the Act of March 2d, 1831,11
which is very similar to the present statute, was designed to curtail
abuses12 of the broad discretionary contempt power vested in federal
judges.13 Writers have argued that the statute restricts only the
criminal, as opposed to the civil, contempt powers because the abuse
which prompted the statute involved criminal contempt. Further-
more, civil contempts, which are remedial in nature, do not prompt
a judge to abuse his contempt power in order to effect a personal
vendetta.'4 Nevertheless, the few courts which have considered the
question uphold the applicability of the statute to civil contempt.1
The Griffin majority follow the approach taken by other federal
courts in not requiring violation of a specific mandate. 16 These courts
have resorted to three basic lines of reasoning: (1) broad construc-
tion of the terms of the contempt statute,17 as in Griffin, which equates
""Be it enacted . . . that the power of the several courts of the United States
to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court,
shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehaviour of any
person or persons in the presence of said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice, the misbehaviour of any of the officers of the said
courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any
officer of said courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person or persons, to any
lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of said courts." Act of Mar.
2d, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487.
12Judge Peck imprisoned and disbarred a lawyer for publishing a criticism of an
opinion written by him, while an appeal of his decision was pending. Impeach-
ment proceedings were brought against Judge Peck for abuse of his discretionary
contempt power, but he was acquitted on January 31, 1831. The following day,
legislative action was initiated to change the law of contempt. This legislation
resulted in the Act of March 2d, 1831. Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress
over Procedure in Criminal Contempt in "Inferior" Federal Courts, 37 HAiv. L.
REv. 1010, 1024-30 (1924).
13The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83, provided: "And be it
further enacted, that all the said courts of the United States shall have the power
to . . . punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all con-
tempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same."
14See Comment, 19 B.U.L. REV. 668, 672 (1939); 54 HARv. L. Rav. 137, 138
(1940).
'5Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 594 (1947); United States v. Montgomery,
155 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. Mont. 1957); Cf. In re Sixth & Wisconsin Tower v.
Aitkin, 108 F.2d 538, 540-41 (7th Cir. 1939). See Wright, Civil and Criminal Con-
tempts in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167, 169-70 (1955). Most courts assume
without question that the statute applies to both civil and criminal contempt. See,
e.g., Raymor Ballroom Co. v. Buck, 110 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1940); Berry v. Midtown
Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cit. 1939).
16Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127, 129 (6th Cit. 1939); Clay v.
Waters, 178 Fed. 385, 394 (8th Cit. 1910); In re Portland Elec. Power Co., 97
F. Supp. 903, 916 (D. Ore. 1947); Lineker v. Dillon, 275 Fed. 460, 470 (N.D. Cal.
1921). That there need not be a specific order for contempt of the Supreme Court
see Merrimack River Say. Bank v. City of Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527 (1911).
"Tin re Portland Elec. Power Co., 97 F. Supp. 903 (D. Ore. 1947), United States
CASE COMMENTS
the word process with an appeal; (2) interpretation of a legal action,
such as the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, as an implied order
prohibiting the unauthorized removal of the subject matter of litiga-
tion;' s (3) inapplicability of the statute as a limitation on the power
of the courts to punish for the unauthorized removal of property in
the custody of the court.19
The first approach, broad construction, is illustrated in United
States v. Zavelo20 In Zavelo, out-of-state witnesses were subpoenaed
by the United States to testify in a criminal proceeding. Immediately
upon acquittal, the defendant instituted civil actions against the wit-
nesses for malicious prosecution, causing process to be served on them
at the trial. The court held that the witnesses were immune from the
service of process while attending the trial. The purpose of this
immunity, or privilege, is to insure the attendance of witnesses. Fur-
thermore, the subpoena is an order which not only requires attendance
but also includes the protection of the court against interference with
the witnesses' privilege. When the defendant caused service of process
to be issued, he violated the privilege, thereby violating the order
within the meaning of the contempt statute.
Another broad construction of the terms of the statute is illustrated
in In re Portland Elec. Power Co.21 Portland construed the terms "rule"
and "order" as referring to the duty of the court to protect property
committed to it. Any unauthorized interference with this property is
violative of a rule and order of the court, and the acting party may
be held in contempt.22
The second approach, implied court order, is most often used in
bankruptcy proceedings.2 3 Here, the authority for a contempt citation
is based on the well established principle that the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy embodies, in itself, a caveat and an injunction to all the
world against interference with the bankrupt's property.24 Since this
principle was derived from the laws of bankruptcy,25 it seems ques-
v. Zavelo, 177 Fed. 536 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1910); Bridges v. Sheldon, 7 Fed. 17 (C.C.D.
Vt. 1880).
I8 Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127, 129 (6th Cir. 1939); Clay v.
Waters, 178 Fed. 385, 394 (8th Cir. 1910); Lineker v. Dillon, 275 Fed. 460, 470
(N.D. Cal. 1921).
19Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932); Merrimack River Say. Bank v. City
of Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527 (1911).
20177 Fed. 536 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1910).
2197 F. Supp. 903 (D. Ore. 1947).
221d. at 917.
23Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1939); Clay v. Waters,
178 Fed. 385 (8th Cir. 1910).
241bid.
25Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127, 129 (6th Cir. 1939).
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tionable whether the implied court order should be used in other
than bankruptcy litigation. However, the implied order has been used
in other contexts to enable the court to preserve the subject matter
of the litigation. In Lineker v. Dillon,26 a judgment debtor, during a
stay of execution, disposed of her property in a manner that would
have made it difficult for the court to execute the judgment. The
court held that the stay of execution order was intended to maintain
the status quo and that such an order was implied in the stay of
execution despite the absence of a specific order forbidding the acts
of the defendant.
2 7
The third approach, that, irrespective of the statute, the federal
courts have the power to hold a party in civil contempt for the un-
authorized removal of property in the custody of law, finds support in
Lamb v. Cramer.2s In Lamb, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed a decision holding an attorney in contempt for his receipt,
during the course of litigation of a creditor-debtor action, of property
in payment of legal fees. Although there was no express order for-
bidding the attorney's conduct, the Court found that his receipt of
the property tended to defeat a subsequent decree of the court, and
he was held in contempt for the removal of property in the custody
of law. Lamb, while upholding the contempt charge, did not resort
to a broad interpretation of the terms of the statute, nor did the court
expressly rely on the implied court order principle. It is significant to
note that the statute was not mentioned. Lamb might therefore stand
for the proposition that the statute imposes no limitation on the
lower federal court's power to punish for the unauthorized removal of
property in its custody. However, it is difficult to reconcile this
view with a previous Supreme Court holding that the statute does
limit and define the contempt powers of the inferior federal courts.2
Moreover, the Court's failure even to consider the statute makes it
26275 Fed. 460 (N.D. Cal. 1921).
27But see Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939). In Berry
a judgment debtor transferred all of his assets to various affiliated corporations
during a stay of execution. The plaintiff alleged that the transfer was in violation
of an implied order. The court held that an order staying execution upon a
judgment cannot be regarded as impledly requiring defendent to maintain the
status quo, so as to render his conduct of making himself execution-proof punish-
able as a contempt of court.
28285 U.S. 217 (1932).
29Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1873). The Supreme
Court held that the statute restricts the contempt power of subordinate federal
courts. However, the Court expressed doubt as to the applicability of the statute
to itself. In Merrimack River Say. Bank v. City of Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527
(1911), the Court held that it had power to hold a party in contempt for wilful
removal of the subject matter of the litigation beyond the reach of the Court ir-
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doubtful that the lower federal courts' powers were being so ex-
tended.30
In summary, there are three approaches used in refuting the posi-
tion that there must be a specific court order forbidding the allegedly
contemptuous act before the actor may be held in contempt: (1) the
broad construction approach; (2) the implied court order approach;
and (3) the Lamb approach. That the third approach exists in fact
is questionable. It may be that Lamb employed the implied court order
approach to substantiate the contempt holding even though the court
did not specifically mention this concept.31 The majority in Griffin
suggested that Lamb might be an unmentioned interpretation of the
statute, thus permitting a contempt holding under the statute even in
absence of a specific order forbidding the attorney's conduct.32
Whatever the case, it is obvious that clarification is needed as to the
effect of the statute on the courts' contempt power. The strained statu-
tory interpretation technique used in Griffin leads us to but one con-
clusion: the statute, as applied to the unauthorized removal of the
subject matter of litigation, is meaningless; and the courts' power to
punish for such acts is unhampered. Either the Supreme Court 33 or
Congress should take a position as to whether the federal courts'
power to protect property in litigation is contingent upon prior is-
suance of a specific order. Whatever the decision, a decision should
be made. RoNALD K. INGoE
respective of the existence of an injunction. But the Court failed to discuss
whether the subordinate federal courts had similar power.30The Griffin minority suggested an explanation for Lamb's failure to mention
the statute: "The Supreme Court wrote in Lamb v. Cramer as if the affront had
been to itself. One can only suppose that it did so because the statute had not
been called to its attention, for the Supreme Court had made it perfectly clear
in Robinson that the subordinate, statutory federal courts are subject to the statute,
and that their powers to punish contempts are effectively limited by it." 363 F.2d
at 215.3lAn examination of the authorities relied upon by Lamb suggests that Lamb
employed the implied court order to bring the attorney's act within the diso-
bedience provision of the statute. Lamb relied upon Clay v. Waters, 178 Fed. 385
(8th Cir. 1910), in holding that the attorney's receipt and diversion of the property,
which was in gremio legis, tended to defeat the decree of the court. Clay, a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, employed the implied court order approach to reject the
defendant's argument that no order had been issued forbidding his conduct as
required by the contempt statute. It is significant that the authorities cited by
Clay for the implied court order principle were bankruptcy cases, which held that
a filing of a petition in bankruptcy embodies a commanding injunction against
interference with the property of the bankrupt. See Comment, 57 YALE LJ. 83,
100 n.97 (1947).
32363 F.2d at 211.
33Unfortunately the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the defendants in
Griffin. Board of Supervisors v. Griffin, 87 Sup. Ct. 395 (1966).
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